Analysis and resources to support the UNFCCC's ultimate objective

COP21 COUNTDOWN


COUNTDOWN 10 - What Success Does not Look Like | Back to top


With a little over 10 weeks to go, COP21 SN will begin a countdown process, focussing each week on one essential theme.


We begin by defining what success does not look like (before progressing in future weeks to more positive messages).


Success does NOT look like an agreement in which Parties announce a commitment to limit warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius, but agree a framework which leave us at high risk of 3 or 4 degrees warming this Century.


  • Success does not look like a process which entrenches low ambition for the next decade (the decade that scientists are telling us is so critical). Is there a risk of that occurring? Yes, there appears to be, and this is why:
  • Parties are submitting 'nationally determined commitments' before knowing the consequences of these commitments (i.e. Parties can't at this stage be certain what sanctions there might be in the event of breach or the extent to which 'ratcheting up' mechanisms will require commitments to be progressively enhanced).
  • Parties are submitting commitments before knowing what financial support may be made available to support commitments (some are therefore choosing to express commitments in conditional form).
  • Given these uncertainties it is unsurprising that commitments are less ambitious than they might be.
  • Aggregated INDCs appear to leave us on track for 3/4 degree warming.
  • The commitments won't come into force until 2020.
  • They may not be revised before 2025.
  • On this scenario the agreement entrenches under-ambition for the next 10 years.

Success does not look like an agreement in which rich countries make promises of financial support for mitigation and adaptation measures with no clarity on how the money will be raised.


Success does not look like an agreement which talks generally about price signals to encourage investment in low carbon energy but does nothing practical to challenge the $1trillion dollars of annual subsidies to fossil fuel industries (the IMF estimate).


We hear that 'perfection is the enemy of the good'; 'that expectations should not be raised'; but such mantras risk creating an 'emperor's new clothes syndrome' in which expectations are so low we're prepared to endorse something that serves principally to distract and delude.


If nothing else the agreement needs to provide a process which continually and relentlessly confronts Parties (and the public) with the gap between trajectory and goal. Transparency and accountability regarding the gap should do something to drive appropriate action.


COUNTDOWN 9 - Progress Fantasy | Back to top

Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, confirmed a significant breakthrough in negotiations in the build up to COP21. For years Parties have polarised over a 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius long-term goal. Now, following the recommendations of an expert review published in May, a form of words has been agreed which strikes a balance between the different positions: ' The Parties will aim to limit warming to 1.5 degrees while committing to limiting it to 2 degrees Celsius'.


Ms Figueres commented:


'This is a tremendously significant and encouraging development in advance of Paris. The UNFCCC process is based on consensus and requires give and take on all sides. This agreement not only represents a necessary compromise on different positions regarding the long-term goal; it also reflects the conclusion of the Structured Expert Dialogue that we need a 'buffer zone' rather than a single 'guardrail'. By aiming to limit warming to 1.5 degrees we significantly reduce the risk of exceeding 2 degrees. Given the high risk of average warming reaching 4 degrees Celsius in the course of the Century (and a humanitarian catastrophe on an unprecedented scale), agreement to this buffer-zone is a brave, practical and historic step forward.'


The update is, of course, fictional. But, we may ask, 'Why does it also seem so improbable? Why do we not even expect negotiating sessions to culminate in progress on substantive issues (even when reasonable compromise positions are readily available?)'


There are two obvious explanations:


Explanation 1: The Parties are so polarised they focus only on advancing their own agendas and are 'deaf' to compromise positions


It's certainly true that a range of historical and political factors make the UNFCCC negotiations peculiarly polarising. It's also true that when what's at stake appears, at least for some, to be the very existence and survival of land and people, 'compromise' can be a hard sell. Nevertheless polarisation between the Parties does not seem a satisfactory explanation for the lack of progress. It's in the interest of all to reach an agreement that avoids a global humanitarian catastrophe and rational actors understand that, in a consensus-based process, that will necessarily entail significant compromise on all sides.


Explanation 2: The current negotiating process fails to advance the development of compromise positions


The focus of the current negotiating process is a text that is a essentially a collage of different proposals from different Parties. Negotiating sessions focus on the procedure and process for refining this text. They divide into different work-streams, with different individuals responsible for different themes (mitigation, adaptation, finance, loss and damage etc). This process does not leave much space for standing back from the detail. It does not invite Parties to view the agreement holistically, and identify, prioritise and address cross-cutting bones of contention. Neither individual Parties nor the Secretariat regard it as their role to develop and propose alternatives (for the Parties this risks undermining their negotiating hand; for the Secretariat, its neutrality).


Explanation 2 is more hopeful. It implies the possibility of rapid progress with some adjustments to the negotiating process. It requires only that the many Parties who are themselves frustrated propose a way forward. At the next negotiating session, the Parties might consider agreeing to the following:


1. Recognising the current rate of progress is not satisfactory, to establish an emergency working group, consisting of a representative cross-section of party delegates and independent mediators, the functions of which would be as follows:


a) to identify key areas of polarisation between the Parties; and


b) to propose compromise solutions on those issues.


It's late in the day of course. But we're a long way from the position in Copenhagen (when the Accord was stitched together in the early hours of the last night of the COP); and there's still time to put things right.Process should be the servant of the Parties (and not the other way round); and the consensus based UNFCCC demands a mediated process tailored to bridging entrenched divisions.


COUNTDOWN 8 - Litmus Test For COP21: 2050 Decarbonisation | Back to top


climate

What's the first thing most analysts will look for when the Paris agreement is unveiled?


What's the litmus test for failing or exceeding expectations?


Agreement to limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius ('the long-term goal) is more or less a given. We know that reduction commitments will be based on INDCs. The filling in the sandwich (or absence of filling, as the case may be) is a pathway to the goal.


So what pathway would meet this criterion? How do we know which path leads over the edge and which to safer ground?


The Global Commons Institute has plotted the trajectory of collective INDCs (see above) to reveal as follows:


  • INDCs, even if honoured, will have consumed by 2030 about 100 GtC in excess of the total carbon budget for 1.5 degrees;
  • INDCs, even if honoured, will have consumed by 2030 the entirety of the carbon budget consistent with a > 66% chance of limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius;
  • A path from INDCs in 2030 to decarbonisation by 2100 leaves us on track for 3.5 or 4 degrees warming;
  • The consequence of the decision to delay deep cuts until 2030 is the absolute necessity of decarbonising in full by 2050.

Unless INDCs are revised downwards, in other words, pathways to the long-term goal are vanishing fast.


In face of the danger, do the Parties bury heads in sand and hope? Or do they identify and commit to the best available escape route? This is the real test of COP21.


A pathway might be defined in terms of both 'router' and 'destination'.


Router (or adjustable pathway)


Calculating a pathway on the basis of IPCC AR5 might at first appear straightforward. AR5 states:


scenarios likely to maintain warming below 2 degrees ‘are characterised by 40 to 70% … GHG emissions reductions by 2050 compared to 2010, and emissions levels near zero or below in 2100.


limited number of studies provide scenarios that are more likely than not to limit warming to 1.5 degrees by 2100 … these … are characterised by … 2050 emission reduction between 70% and 95% below 2010.


This implies that an agreement to reduce collective emissions by at least 70% by 2050 would be consistent with both the 1.5 and 2 degree Celsius long-term goals. However consideration of the carbon budget reveals the futility of trying to define the pathway in such terms: what matters is the area covered by the graph as a whole, not where the line happens to be at any given point in time.


The IPCC analysis did not include the content of INDCs. AR5 did, however, make the more general observation:


Delaying additional mitigation to 2030 will substantially increase the challenges associated with limiting warming over the 21st century to below 2 degrees C relative to pre-industrial levels. It will require substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050; a much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this period; a larger reliance on [Carbon Dioxide Removal] in the long term; and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts.


AR5 specifies a carbon budget for a greater than 66% chance of limiting warming to 2 degrees celsius: 790 Gigatonnes of Carbon (GtC), of which 515 had already been 'spent' by 2011, leaving just 275 GtC. Since more is being spent now, there is less to spend later: aiming to reduce emissions by 70% by 2050 is no longer consistent with the temperature goals.


Fixed sign-posts, in other words, quickly become dangerously misleading, guiding us in the wrong direction. The router element of the pathway needs to reflect the fact that our orientation changes with every turn we. The only way to do that effectively is to set it in terms of the carbon budget. The text might take the following form:


The Parties acknowledge that the carbon budget consistent with the long term goal is [790] Gt Carbon - x [where x is the carbon emitted between 2011 and the present]. The Parties commit to remaining within this budget, and INDCs will be reviewed and revised on that basis.


If the Parties accept that 790 GtC will inevitably be exceeded, the budget might be increased to say 820 or 900 GtC (offering respectively >50% and >33% chances of limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius).



Destination (decarbonisation date)


An alternative (or additional) option to a pathway framed in terms of the carbon budget, focusses on the destination - or decarbonisation date. Clearly the comments above apply: the date for decarbonisation consistent with the temperature goal depends on what happens in the interim.


However politically Paris needs to set a decarbonisation date. The router framed in terms of the carbon budget it too technical and arcane to communicate a strong message of progress and commitment.


Given the 'overshoot' of INDCS, a decarbonisation date of 2100 would serve only to mislead, implying we have more time than we've got.


The Parties can rescue Paris with an honest assessment of where we are. They must confront and acknowledge the consequence of INDCs that choose to 'spend now': complete decarbonisation by 2050.


Even if not legally binding, such a commitment would send a powerful and necessary signal to the markets. Climbing such a steep path might be another matter; but for Paris to be regarded as a success it must clearly signpost the scale of the challenge.


Acceptable pathways


  • decarbonisation by 2050 *
  • Parties commit to remaining within carbon budget [790 / 820/ 900 GtC] *

Unacceptable (misleading) pathways


  • decarbonisation by 2100 X
  • to reduce GHG emissions by 70 % by 2050 and 100% by 2100 X
  • no pathway X

COUNTDOWN 7 - #saveourclimaterights | Back to top


We recommend that those Parties most at risk from the impacts of climate change require the COP21 agreement to preserve expressly their legal position on future claims for loss and damage.


After 8 months of attempting to work with an 80 + page negotiating text, the recently emerged 9 page draft lays bare the lack of ambition. The last negotiating session before Paris begins on 19 October.


The co-chairs have invited Parties to contact them directly with any concerns at adp.chair.email@gmail.com.


When the political process fails, the courts may provide next the port of call. The 'no harm principle' (or 'principle of prevention') is the foundation of international environmental law (i.e there's no sovereign right to exploit natural resources in a way which harms your neighbours). International lawyers increasingly agree that it applies to climate change (see, for example, the International Law Association principles and Oslo principles). As a result states have a duty to ensure (with due diligence) that greenhouse gas emissions under their jurisdiction or control do not cause harm to the environment of other states or in areas beyond national jurisdiction.


If there's an assumption that climate change litigation faces insurmountable hurdles then Parties may wish to consider two milestone cases from this year:


  • The Urgenda Case in which a citizen's platform brought a successful claim against the Dutch government for failing to take sufficient steps to protect the people from the effects of climate change (with reference being made to fundamental human rights principles including the right to life).

  • The Leghari Case in which a farmer brought a case against the government of Pakistan for failing to implement its climate change strategy, resulting in the Court ordering the establishment of a new Commission.

Also relevant is the judgement of the US Court of Appeals from 2009, which accepted the viability of a claim brought by 8 US States + New York City against 6 power generation companies for climate change damage (following a change of circumstances the judgement was partially reversed by the US Supreme Court).


Links to all the materials mentioned above can be found here:



Such cases (and general principles of law) indicate the potential for individuals, organisations and governments to bring legal action for climate change loss and damage.


Signing up to the Paris agreement may imply that pre-existing legal rights have been given up:


lex specialis derogat legi generali ('specific law overrides general law').


In other words, in the event your government or your people were to bring a claim for climate change loss and damage at some later date, it might be argued:


a) But you have expressly agreed that levels of emissions should be 'nationally determined'; and


b) You have agreed that climate change loss and damage should be addressed through mechanisms under the UNFCCC.


To avoid the risk of compromise to your country's legal position we advise you consider writing to the co-chairs along the following lines:


'Dear Co-chairs


Thank you for your non-paper of 5 October, containing a radically simplified 'basis of negotiation'.


<4>We will be unable to support any agreement that risks compromising our pre-existing legal position in relation to potential legal claims for loss and damage (i.e. the 'no harm' principle). As there has been no suggestion that an agreement is intended to reduce protections for vulnerable and developing Parties we see no difficulty in inserting an express provision for the avoidance of doubt. We propose a clause along the following lines for inclusion in the Preamble:

This agreement shall take effect without prejudice to existing principles of international law [including the no harm principle, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays.]'


Equity was always first and foremost about sharing the remaining carbon budget consistent with the temperature target. No Party should be expected to compromise its legal position on account of the collective failure to come to terms with this fundamental aspect of UNFCCC compliance.


....' | Back to top

COUNTDOWN 4 - Conflicting Reports | Back to top


Last Friday, the UNFCCC Secretariat published its synthesis report into the aggregate effect of INDCs.


Given the current stage of negotiations one might have expected the report's conclusions to be presented with a positive spin. Notable, however, is the inconsistency between the accompanying press-release and the content of the report itself.


The conflicts betray the unenviable position of the Secretariat. On the one hand it has a duty to provide accurate information to the Parties. On the other, the political terrain demands that it cajole the world into accepting INDCs as an important step forward (rather than regression from Kyoto). Sadly the two positions are difficult to reconcile.


The press release begins as follows:


'An unprecedented world-wide effort is underway to combat climate change, building confidence that nations can cost effectively meet their stated objective of keeping a global temperature rise to under 2 degree C.'


This confident assertion is bluntly contradicted at paragraph 53 of the report:


'while actions enshrined in the INDCs will deliver sizeable emission reductions compared with the pre-2020 period, global aggregate emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the INDCs do not fall within 2 °C scenarios.'


The press release goes on to quote Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary to the UNFCCC, as follows:


'The INDCs have the capability of limiting the forecast temperature rise to around 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100, by no means enough but a lot lower than the estimated four, five, or more degrees of warming projected by many prior to the INDCs.'


Although inconsistent with the opening gambit the assessment is presented as evidence of progress. If you assumed the figure of 2.7 degrees Celsius was backed up in the report, you're not alone - but you are mistaken. The authors of the report explain, at para. 39, that they are unable to estimate the temperature rise by 2100:


'By lowering emissions below pre-INDC trajectories, the INDCs contribute to lowering the expected temperature rise until and beyond 2100. However, temperature levels by the end of the century strongly depend on assumptions on socioeconomic drivers, technology development and action undertaken by Parties beyond the time frames stated in their INDCs (e.g. beyond 2025 and 2030). Making such assumptions is beyond the scope of this report.'


Increasing emissions


climate

What does the report actually say then about the aggregate effect of INDCs on emissions? If the reference to 'sizeable emission reductions compared with the pre-2020 period' implies that INDCs will reduce annual global emissions by 2030,it is misleading. According to para. 34, even if INDCs are fully implemented, annual global emissions of CO2 -equ will continue to increase through to 2030, and will be 11-22% higher by 2030 compared to 2010 (or 37-52% higher than in 1990).


IPCC AR5 concludes that, as from 2011, we must keep within a budget of 1000 Gt C02 for a likely probability of limiting warming to 2 degrees. Think of that as an empty bath we start running in 2011, which mustn't be allowed to overflow. Following the trajectory of INDCs the UNFCCC report concludes that by 2025 the bath will be just over half full; by 2030 it will be three quarters full. Even if global emissions stabilise post 2030 (and there is no evidence that they will) the bath will be overflowing by 2035 (with the tap still running for decades to come).


In contradiction with para. 53, para 40 of the report claims there remains a possibility of staying within the 2 degree limit. It's worth considering this claim in the context of the 1000 Gt budget. To stay within it two things would have to happen:


i) INDCs to 2030 would need to be fully implemented; and


ii) total emissions between 2030 and decarbonisation date (let's say 2080) would need to be less than total emissions between 2025 and 2030.


that's not a realistic scenario. Wouldn't it be fairer to all Parties to make that clear?


Perhaps the most immediately revealing part of the report is the image at figure 9 of the report (attached, and at p.42). This provides a visual comparison of INDC trajectories to 2030 with 'pre-INDC scenarios'. The trajectory range for INDCs (taking account of conditional components) appears to blend with the pre-INDC trajectory - there's little sign of an ambitious new path emerging. The impression is confirmed by para. 36: without the conditional elements of INDCs, global annual emissions are down by just 1 Gt Co2 -equ by 2025 compared to the pre INDC trajectory; and by just 1.9 Gt CO2 equ by 2030.


Link to adaptation
Para. 59 of the Report is a reminder of the importance of honest and realistic assessments regarding the long-term goal:


Many Parties communicated that their adaptation components are guided by long-term development aspirations as well as by global climate objectives, including the goal of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, which a few Parties used as a reference point for defining their adaptation components. Countries are planning their adaptation strategies now on the assumption that warming will be limited to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius. That means, for example, constructing flood defences on that basis.


The real message


The real message of the report is, predictably, that INDCs don't deliver anything like enough, soon enough. There has to be a Plan B. Politically that message may be unpalatable; but it won't go away.


COUNTDOWN 2: SIDS, Debt Swaps and the Carbon Budget | Back to top


'The sense of guilt or culpability or reparations - I just categorically reject that.' Chief US climate negotiator Todd Stern on being asked about climate debt, December 2009. 'We are not assigning guilt, merely responsibility. As they say in the US, if you break it, you buy it.' Bolivian ambassador to the United Nations Pablo Solon, December 2009.


Small Island Developing States (SIDS)


'Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are low-lying coastal countries that tend to share similar sustainable development challenges, including small but growing populations, limited resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, excessive dependence on international trade, and fragile environments. Their growth and development is also held back by high communication, energy and transportation costs, irregular international transport volumes, disproportionately expensive public administration and infrastructure due to their small size, and little to no opportunity to create economies of scale.' (Wikipedia). Such characteristics commonly result in high levels of borrowing and indebtedness. While being particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the high proportion of public funds servicing debt repayments means finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation is in short supply. Essentially, SIDS (and other vulnerable and developing countries) lack the resources to safeguard themselves from existential threats caused by others, at least in part because of the debts they owe to those same others.


Common resource


The earth's atmosphere, the critical influence on our climate, is a common resource (part of the 'global commons'). Emissions of greenhouse gases compound the greenhouse effect, adding to global warming, with severe consequences for all but most immediately for vulnerable and developing states. Countries are nervous about cutting their emissions for fear of putting themselves at economic disadvantage. But if country X consumes a disproportionately large share of the global GHG budget, it also limits what remains for others. On basic principles of accountability and responsibility its emissions create a debt in favour of those others.


Debtors and creditors


More generally, the relationship between developed and developing countries might be characterised as follows:


Developed Country Developing Country
-
Finance Creditor Debtor
GHG emissions Debtor Creditor

When proposals for debt relief arise in relation to developing countries the point is commonly made 'the economic system depends on the principle of debts being honoured'. Does a similar principle not hold true for the climate system with even greater force (given the context of a rapidly diminishing global budget)? Such an analysis suggests that 'debt swaps' might play a useful part in climate finance: writing off developed country GHG debt against developing country financial borrowings.


Carbon budget


Carbon trading is a well-established concept under the market mechanisms of the UNFCCC. In order for such a market to serve its purpose, however, it needs to be grounded in a carbon budget. If concept of a carbon budget is sometimes connected with a 'top-down' approach to the UNFCCC, that is nothing more than a loose association. That there's only so much greenhouse gas that can be added to the atmosphere before warming exceeds a certain level is an elementary and obvious scientific truth - as true on Mars or Venus as it is on the Earth - which exists entirely independent of any UNFCCC process. Determining the precise level of the 'carbon budget' for limiting warming to a particular temperature is, of course, a complex exercise, particularly given the role of feedback effects (e.g. when ice melts, to be replaced by dark water, less heat is reflected, more absorbed, increasing warming). But that doesn't mean that there is no carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius. If it did, Bill Gates might just as reasonably argue that the complexity of determining his tax liability meant that he therefore had no liability. Indeed the IPCC, reporting to the Parties, and generally regarded as conservative in its conclusions, states in AR5 (SPM2.1):


Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius ... with a probability of > 66% would require cumulative CO2 emissions ... since 1870 ... to remain below about 2900 GtCO2 ... About 1900 GtCO2 had already been emitted by 2011.


Per capita shares


Once a carbon budget is agreed, determining levels of GHG debt and credit becomes reasonably straightforward. One approach, in relation to the remaining budget, would be to divide it by global population giving a per capita share of the budget. A 'fair share' of the budget for a particular country would be the per capita price multiplied by country population. Any departure from that fair share would represent a credit or debit and be priced accordingly. Under such a scheme developed countries, with high per capita emissions, would become GHG debtors, developed countries GHG creditors. Since shares of the carbon budget would be on a pro rata basis, variations in the level of the overall budget might be accommodated with relative ease.


GHG austerity measures


The concept of debt swaps may provide the key to the question of climate change finance. Critically it would incentivise GHG austerity on all sides, moving us away from the era of reckless and uninhibited borrowing against our future.


COUNTDOWN 1: Climate Damage - Who Pays the Price? | Back to top


As the social, environmental and economic costs of climate change continue to mount, there's a question that can't be put off any longer. Who's going to pay for it all?


There are only so may possibilities.


1. 'The polluter' (i.e. fossil fuel companies and governments in proportion to their contribution to the problem);


2. The victim (i.e there's no adequate scheme for compensating climate change loss and damage);


3. The insurance industry;

4. A global climate fund.

Insurance might initially sound attractive (i.e. 'someone else!') but simply defers the question. Given the predictability and inevitability of damage, there's not much in it for insurers, and the question becomes 'Who's going to pay the premiums?'


Much the same can be said of a global climate fund: who's going to fund it and to what extent?


Addressing the issue from the global perspective (rather than the interests of any one negotiating block) leads to the question 'What approach will work best to support climate change mitigation?'


Directing the market towards clean energy means ensuring the polluter pays the costs of climate loss and damage. Fossil fuel companies, and governments responsible for national targets, must me made to consider climate change loss and damage as a potential liability. This is what will move the world away from reckless and unaccountable GHG [greenhouse gas] spending, towards austerity (and determined investment in clean energy).


Clearly vulnerable and developing countries should take care to avoid trading potential invaluable litigation rights for non-committal framework language on loss and damage. Litigation must remain the fall-back position unless and until a satisfactory mechanism is agreed for maintaining a global fund.


More generally the Paris agreement should support litigation rights, not in the spirit of belligerence, but as a mechanism for correcting market failure, and as our best hope of avoiding the 'tragedy of the commons'.


Chinese | Back to top


气候变化带来的损害:谁来付费?

由于气候变化的影响所带来的社会、经济和环境的成本不断上升,其所带来的一个重要问题已经不能一拖再拖了:谁来为此付费?


有几种可能:


1 谁污染谁付费-由化石能源公司及政府为他们过去的历史贡献付费


2 受害者付费-但到目前为止还没有一个就气候变化损失和损害机制进行补偿的机制


3 由保险机构付费


4 成立一家全球气候基金


由保险公司来付费,可能在一开始听上去还比较有吸引力(至少是别人来付费!)但这仅仅是简单的拖延问题。由于损害的可预见性和必然性,保险公司并无利可图。所以,问题最终会演变成“谁来付保险费”?


成立一家全球气候基金也面临同样的问题:谁来出资以及出资额度是多少?


如果从全球利益的角度(而不是从某些谈判团体的利益)来讨论这个议题,那么问题将会是“采用哪种方式来减缓气候变化才是最佳的途径”?


将市场引导向清洁能源即意味着污染者承担气候损失和损害。政府和化石能源公司应当对国家减排目标负责并且把气候损失和损害作为其潜在负债来考虑。也只有这样,才能意志坚定地把全世界从不负责任的(高碳排放)投资引导向清洁能源投资。


显然,受气候变化影响的发展中国家应当提防并且避免在巴黎协议中就气候损失和损害问题仅仅达成不承担义务的框架性措辞,而放弃诉讼的权利。除非就一个全球气候基金达成令各方满意的协议,否则保留诉讼的权利是必须要守住的立场。


通常,巴黎协议应当支持诉讼权,不是为了鼓励纠纷,而是作为一项改正市场失灵的机制,同时也是一项避免“公共的悲剧”的期待之所在。


Arabic | Back to top


الأضرار الناجمة عن المناخ من سيتحمل التكاليف؟

بينما تستمر تكاليف التغير الاجتماعي والبيئي والاقتصادي للمناخ في ازدياد، يلح سؤال لا يمكن تأجيله أكثر من ذلك. من سيتحمل تكلفة كل ذلك؟


هناك عدد محدود من الخيارات:


.١ الملوث - بمعنى شركات الوقود الاحفوري والحكومات كلٌ حسب نسبة مساهمته في المشكلة.


٢ الضحية – بمعنى أنه لا توجد خطة ملائمة للتعويض عن أضرار تغير المناخ


.٣ صناعة التأمين


٤ صندوق تمويل عالمي خاص بالمناخ


في البداية، قد يبدو التأمين (بمعنى إلقاء المسئولية على طرف آخر) خيارا جذابا. لكنه يؤجل القضية فقط. ضرر المناخ محتوم ومُتوقَّع ولذلك ليس هناك فرق كبير عند شركات التأمين. وهنا يصبح السؤال"من سيدفع أقساط التأمين؟"


قد نقول إلى حد كبير نفس الشئ عن الشيئ نفسه ينطبق على صندوق التمويل العالمي الخاص بالمناخ: من سيموله وإلى أي مدى؟


إن معالجة القضية من منظور عالمي (بدلاً من مناقشتها في إطار مصلحة طرف من الأطراف) يقودنا إلى السؤال التالي: أي طريقة ستكون أجدى لدعم مراجعة تغير المناخ؟


.توجيه السوق إلى الطاقة النظيفة يعني ضمان أن الملوث سيدفع تكاليف خسائر المناخ وأضراره.


يجب على شركات الوقود الأحفوري والحكومات المسؤولة عن الأهداف القومية أن تتحمل المسءولية عن خسائر وأضرار المناخ. وهذا ما سيوجه العالم بعيداً عن الاستهلاك المستهتر وغير المسؤول لغاز الاحتباس الحراري والسعي إلى التقشف والاستثمار الحازم في الطاقة النظيفة.


واضح أن الدول الضعيفة والنامية يجب أن تحرص على تجنب المتاجرة بحقوق التقاضي الغالية المتاحة من أجل إطار لغوي غير ملزم بشأن الخسائر والأضرار. يجب أن يظل التقاضي في موضع الاحتياط إلا إذا – إلى أن - يتم الاتفاق على آلية مُرضية لإنشاء صندوق تمويل عالمي


وبشكل عام فإن اتفاقية باريس يجب أن تدعم حقوق التقاضي، ليس بروح العداوة، ولكن بوصفها آلية لتصحيح فشل السوق، وكأفضل أمل متاح لدينا من أجل تجنب "تراجيديا المشاع"


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Разрушение климата: Кто за это заплатит?


Социальные, экологические и экономические издержки изменения климата продолжают расти, и возникает вопрос , который не терпит больше отлагательств . Кто будет платить за все это?


Существует не так много вариантов :

1. " Загрязнитель "(т. е топливно-энергетические компании и правительства в про порции их влияния на климат);

2. Потерпевший ( так же нет адекватной схемы компенсации потерь от поврежде ния и изменения окружающей среды);

3. Страховая отрасль;

4. Всемирный фонд по поддержке климата.


Страхование изначально может показ��ться привлекательным ( т. е " кто то ещё!") но это просто откладывает решение вопроса. Учитывая предсказуемость и неизбежность повреждения, и что существует не так много страховщиков, опять же появляется проблема' Кто будет платить страховые взносы?'


То же самое можно сказать и о всемирном климатическом фонде: кто будет его финансировать и в какой степени? Решение проблемы с глобальной точки зрения ( а не в интересах какого либо одного блока переговоров) заставляет задуматься " Какой же подход в решении проблемы все же будет работать лучше, что бы смягчить последствия изменения климата? Направление рынка к чистой энергии означает что " загрязнитель" будет оплачивать издержки по поддержанию климата. Топливно-энергетические компании и правительства, ответственные за национальные планы, должны рассматривать изменения и повреждения климата как потенциальную угрозу. Это то что будет отодвигать мир от безрассудного и неисчислимого расхода ПГ(парниковых газов), и приведёт к строгой экономии ( и уверенному инвестированию в чистую энергию). Очевидно ,что уязвимым и развивающимся странам следует позаботиться о том , что бы избежать обмена потенциально-бесценных судебных прав на не обязывающие обещания по потерям и повреждениям. Судебные издержки должны оставаться возвратной позицией до тех пор пока не появиться удовлетворяющий всех механизм для поддержания всемирного фонда.


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Daño climático: ¿Quién paga el precio?


A medida que los costos sociales, medioambientales y económicos del cambio climático siguen creciendo, hay una pregunta que no se puede posponer más. ¿Quién va a pagar todos estos costos?


Solo existen éstas posibilidades.


1.‘El contaminador’ (Es decir, las compañías productoras de combustibles fósiles y los gobiernos en proporción a sus contribuciones al problema);


2.‘La víctima’ (Es decir, no hay un esquema adecuado para compensar pérdidas y daños ocasionados por cambios climáticos);


3.‘La industria aseguradora’;


4.‘Un fondo climático global’.


Que lo pague la industria aseguradora puede sonar atractivo en un principio (Es decir ‘¡otro!’) pero simplemente difiere la cuestión.


Dado la predictibilidad e inevitabilidad del daño, no hay demasiado atractivo en el negocio para las aseguradoras, y la cuestión que surge es: ¿Quién va a pagar las primas?


Se puede decir prácticamente lo mismo del fondo climático: ¿Quién lo va a capitalizar y en qué medida?


Al abordar el tema desde una perspectiva global (en vez que desde los intereses de un bloque determinado que esté negociando) surge la pregunta: ¿Qué abordaje será el que mejor funcione para mitigar el cambio climático?


Dirigir el mercado hacia energía limpia significa asegurar que el contaminador paga los costos de las pérdidas y daños ocasionados por el cambio climático. Las compañías productoras de combustibles fósiles, y los gobiernos responsables de las metas nacionales deben considerar las pérdidas y los daños ocasionados por el cambio climático como una responsabilidad en potencia. Esto es lo que producirá que el mundo se aleje de gastos imprudentes e irresponsables en gases que causan el efecto invernadero y que se muevan hacia la austeridad (e inversiones decididas en energías limpias).


Resulta claro que los países vulnerables y en desarrollo deben evitar cambiar derechos de litigio de valor inestimable por lenguaje marco no vinculante sobre pérdidas y daños. El litigio contencioso debe ser el primer recurso salvo y hasta que haya un acuerdo sobre un mecanismo satisfactorio para mantener un fondo global.


Para terminar, el acuerdo de París debe apoyar los derechos de litigio contencioso, no en un espíritu beligerante, pero como un mecanismo para corregir las fallas del mercado, y como nuestra mejor esperanza para evitar la 'tragedia de los comunes'.

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Les dommages climatiques : qui paie le prix?

Comme les coûts sociaux, environnementaux et économiques du changement climatique continuent de monter, il y a une question qui ne peut plus être mise de côté. Qui va payer pour tout cela ?


Les options sont limitées :


1. «Le pollueur» (c'est-à-dire les entreprises des énergies fossiles et les gouvernements en proportion de leurs contributions au problème) ;

2. « La victime » (sachant qu’il n'existe aucun système adéquat pour compenser les pertes et les dommages liés au changement climatique ;)

3. Le secteur de l’assurance ;

4. Un fonds mondial pour le climat.

L'assurance pourrait, dans un premier temps, paraître attrayante (c.-à-d. quelqu'un d’autre !), mais cela ne ferait que reporter le problème. En effet, compte tenu de la prévisibilité et de l'inévitabilité des dommages, il n'y aurait aucun intérêt pour eux et on en reviendrait à se poser la question suivant : «qui va payer les primes?


Les mêmes reproches peuvent être fait concernant un fonds mondial pour le climat : qui va le financer et dans quelle mesure ?


Si on aborde la question dans une perspective mondiale (plutôt qu'à travers les intérêts d'un bloc de négociation) cela nous mène à la question suivant : quelle est l'approche qui fonctionnera le mieux pour soutenir l'atténuation des changements climatiques ?


Orienter le marché vers une énergie propre signifie qu'on s’assure que le pollueur paie les coûts liés aux dommages climatiques. Les entreprises d’énergies fossiles et les gouvernements, responsables des normes qu’ils se sont fixés, doivent considérer les pertes et dommages du changement climatique comme une réelle responsabilité. C’est ce qui va encourager le monde à se distancer d’un système de dépenses imprudents et irresponsables sur les GES (gaz à effet de serre) en développant un modèle d’austérité et en investissant davantage dans les énergies propres.


Il est clair que les pays vulnérables et en voie de développement doivent éviter un échange commercial de leurs droits potentiels de litige contre un canevas de langage évasif sur les pertes et les dommages. Le litige doit rester la solution de repli jusqu’à ce qu’un mécanisme satisfaisant soit trouvé pour le maintien d’un fonds mondial.


Plus généralement, l'accord de Paris devrait soutenir les droits de litige, non dans un esprit de belligérance, mais comme un mécanisme pour corriger les défaillances du marché et comme notre meilleur espoir d'éviter la «tragédie des communs».